THE ADVANTAGE OF A REPUBLIC OVER A DEMOCRACY

constitution1.png I have just finished reading a fascinating book about James Madison. This book describes how Madison worked to gain both the approval of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights (See here for a description of the book.).

Imagine those times. No television. No microphones. Nonetheless, small and frail, bookish and soft spoken, Madison managed to take a major role in shaping the destiny of a frontier nation.

Following the Constitutional Convention, Madison wrote as one of several authors of the Federalist Papers. The Federalist Papers both helped the People understand how the new government would work and to convince them to vote for it. One concept that Madison wanted people to understand is the difference between a republic and a democracy. Here is an excerpt from The Federalist, Paper # 10 that addresses that basic difference.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

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About Citizen Tom

I am just an average citizen interested in promoting informed participation in the political process.
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5 Responses to THE ADVANTAGE OF A REPUBLIC OVER A DEMOCRACY

  1. You are so right. A Republic is the way to protect the rights of the individual. It requires the limited government with many checks and balances.

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  2. J. Tyler Ballance says:

    See the DVD, The Fall of Fujimori, if you would like to see what imperils our modern Republic today.

    Former Peruvian Presidente, Al “Death Squad” Fujimori, suspended the Constitution, then had his guys write a new one and abolished, then reformed the Congress and Courts with his lackies.

    One wonders, after watching this video, if the Neocons took lessons from Fujimori-san.

    For those of us in the U.S. who are being asked to suspend our Liberty by increments, this video is a powerful cautionary tale of what may be ahead for us, if we do not act NOW, to reign-in our government.

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  3. Citizen Tom says:

    J. Tyler Ballance – Even if Neocons pose some kind of mysterious and sinister danger, there are relatively few people who call themselves Neocons. In fact, I doubt most people have any idea what the term means.

    The larger threat to our republic is ignorance. Most people do not bother to read the Constitution. Most people cannot explain the difference between rights and privileges. Most people think compassion is about taxing the “rich” so government can give money to the poor. Most people think it makes sense to put politicians in charge of the education of their children.

    We, not Neocons, Nazis, Communists, Democrats, or Republicans, are our own worst enemy. It is our government. It is our country. If we do not love it and protect it, no one else will do it for us.

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  5. Pingback: WHAT ARE THE SIGNS THAT OUR REPUBLIC IS ABOUT TO FALL? — PART 1 | Citizen Tom

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